Ok, de conclusie (is wel copyrightschending denk ik, maar goed ik heb de bron opgegeven)
In this paper, we solved the problem of privacy-preserving authentication between offline peers, based on the notion of being mutual contacts. We demonstrated the practicability of our approach via a comprehensive experimental perfor- mance evaluation, which attests negligible overhead under real-world conditions. We motivated our work with two dis- tinct design flaws in AirDrop that allow attackers to learn the phone numbers and email addresses of both sender and receiver devices. However, our proposed protocol can sup- port other applications, even outside of Apple’s ecosystem. For example, Google recently launched a similar platform called “Nearby” for Android [41, 86], where device visibility can be restricted to the user’s contacts and thus would benefit from our protocol for privacy-preserving authentication.
Our proposed solution PrivateDrop prevents users from disclosing personal information to non-contacts. Still, users remain trackable via their account-specific UUID in the TLS certificate, which gives room for future work. Nevertheless, our results demonstrate that PSI with malicious security is ready for practical deployment, even in offline scenarios be- tween resource-constrained mobile devices. We would be glad to see our open-source implementation being adopted in end-user systems such as AirDrop.
Gast
